What must I believe to be saved?

Both Timothy Davis and Custard have posted in connection with this question. The issue is simply `what must I believe to be saved?' or `what propositions are (part of) the object of saving faith?'. My inclination is to say that one must believe, or be prepared to believe,

1. the doctrine of the Trinity (that there are three divine persons in one divine substance)
2. the doctrine of the Incarnation (that the second divine person became human).

But is this enough? Does one not need to believe something about the atonement to be saved? Or something about salvation?

Or is it too much? Would it rule out people that we might want to be saved, such as the heroes of the Old Testament, the penitent thief on the cross, the woman Jesus met that had haemorrhagic bleeding, or the mentally ill.

One must rule out (must one not?) from being Christians, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and Unitarians (e.g. John Biddle).

It's a separate question whether there is anything more to faith than belief in propositions. James 2:19 might seem to suggest that there is. Gordon Clark disagrees with this interpretation in his What Is Saving Faith? and Saving Faith, as does John Robbins in his What Is Faith? Some suggest that one proposition belief in which distinguishes us from the demons is 'Jesus died for me' -- but is it not possible that some non-Christian might wrongly think that Jesus died for everyone and, therefore, for him or her, whether or not he or she had repentance and faith? I'm inclined to the view that there must be something non-propositional, trust, involved as well. But is that sufficient by itself? I think not, as Mormons and JWs claim to trust Christ.

Divine Accommodation

Some Christians (e.g. Calvin) have argued that in some way God has to accommodate himself to us in his revelation in the Bible because the truth about him is too 'high' for us to grasp:

For who is so devoid of intellect as not to understand that God, in so speaking, lisps with us as nurses are wont to do with little children? Such modes of expression, therefore, do not so much express what kind of a being God is, as accommodate the knowledge of him to our feebleness. In doing so, he must, of course, stoop far below his proper height. (Institutes of the Christian Religion, I.xiii.1)

Two things are odd about this:

1. The people putting forward these ideas think that they can grasp the truth that is allegedly too high for us to grasp. Maybe they think that the ideas are too high for normal people, and that the Bible is written primarily for normal people.
   
2. The consequence of this view is that God reveals falsehoods to us in Scripture, and so the Bible is not wholly true. It may be as near the truth as we can get, but it is still false.

I'm puzzled. Can anybody clear this up for me by defending the doctrine of divine accommodation, please?

Were the heroes of the OT regenerate?

We say that the heroes of the Old Testament had repentance and (some degree of) faith, and, consequently, were justified, and will be (or have been) glorified, but were they regenerated and indwelt by the Holy Spirit? Were they united with Christ? If so, what was the difference between them and us, believers now? If not, how come they managed repentance and faith, for which we need the help of the indwelling Holy Spirit?

Is it ever permissible to deceive?

Not long ago the government urged us to leave lights on when we go out, in order to prevent burglaries. There are three possible ways of looking at this:

1. It's a case of impermissible deception: the government is asking us to bring it about that burglars believe a falsehood, viz. that we are in when we aren't, and it's always wrong to bring it about that someone believe a falsehood (at least if the person does not consent).
   
2. It's a case of permissible deception: the government is asking us to bring it about that burglars believe a falsehood, but the burglars have no right to know the truth here, so their rights are not violated if we bring it about that they believe a falsehood. (A similar argument was used to justify Sven-Goran Eriksson's lying to his employers about his sex life.)
3. It's not a case of deception: we do not intend to bring it about that burglars believe a falsehood, we intend to bring it about that they do not believe the truth (viz. that we are out) -- our intentions would be fulfilled if the burglar suspended judgment. We intend merely that the lights' being on should bring it about that the burglar not think that we are in.

I'm inclined to favour (1) above. (I wonder if a burglar has ever broken into a house with the lights on, found nobody at home, and trashed the place, leaving a message saying 'Thought you would try to deceive me, did you?'. It may also be the case, long term, that the result of this scheme will be that burglars will break into more houses with lights on, thinking that nobody is at home, and end up having to beat up the occupants. This may thus lead to a rise in violent crime even if it leads to a decrease in burglary.)

Another interesting example is a friend of a friend that used to smuggle Chinese Bibles into China. He was asked by a custom officer whether he had any literature in his case. He replied:

I have no literature that I can read.

He said this because he thought it would be morally wrong to say 'No', as that would have been a lie. He also thought that it would have been foolish to say 'Yes', as then the custom officer would have found and confiscated the Bibles. He seemed quite pleased with the way round the impasse that he discovered (being unable to read Chinese). But if he wished to bring it about that the custom officer believe a falsehood (viz. that he had no literature in his case) is that really any better than lying? Obviously the custom officer's job was not to ascertain whether he had any literature that he could read but whether he had any literature at all in his case. But perhaps this friend of a friend intended merely that the custom officer shouldn't believe that he had any literature in his case; perhaps he intended just to confuse the officer.

One final, famous, example on the same point. In response to the famous case of the mad axeman at the door asking whether one's friend is inside, many mediaeval casuists asserted that one should say 'non est hic', which could mean either the true 'he is not eating here' or the false 'he is not here'. But if one intends that the axeman should take it in the latter sense, as surely one does, is one not attempting to deceive him, and is this not as bad as lying to him? (Again, perhaps it is possible that one is intending merely that he shouldn't form the opinion that the friend is inside; perhaps one is trying only to confuse, but this seems unlikely.)

Other examples of deception are:

(i) telling children 'noble' lies, e.g. about Santa Claus/Father Christmas;

(ii) teaching children simplified, and strictly false, versions of chemistry, physics, etc., because the truth is too hard for them to understand

(iii) giving approximations because the exact truth would be too tedious to spell out in detail.

One can argue that (iii) doesn't really count because one is affirming not the approximation as an exact truth, but the approximation as an approximation, and this will be understood by one's interlocutor. Are (i) and (ii) justified, though?

Lastly, and most strikingly, there appear to be examples in the Bible where God himself deceives. The two most famous are 2 Thessalonians 2: 11, 'Therefore God sends them [the perishing] a strong delusion, so that they may believe what is false', and the story of God's sending the lying spirit to deceive Ahab, reported in 1 Kings 22:

19 Micaiah continued, "Therefore hear the word of the LORD : I saw the LORD sitting on his throne with all the host of heaven standing around him on his right and on his left. 20 And the LORD said, 'Who will entice Ahab into attacking Ramoth Gilead and going to his death there?'
"One suggested this, and another that. 21 Finally, a spirit came forward, stood before the LORD and said, 'I will entice him.'

22 " 'By what means?' the LORD asked.
" 'I will go out and be a lying spirit in the mouths of all his prophets,' he said.
" 'You will succeed in enticing him,' said the LORD. 'Go and do it.'

23 "So now the LORD has put a lying spirit in the mouths of all these prophets of yours. The LORD has decreed disaster for you."

Is it significant that in these passages God acts through secondary means rather than directly affirming a falsehood himself. Do these passages show that it is permissible sometimes for us to deceive after all? Or do they show only that it is sometimes permissible for God to deceive?

Any thoughts?

The text's original meaning

Ian has asked me to ask this question for him:

Do we commit the etymological fallacy when we're trying to determine the original meaning of the biblical author? And if so, how should Christians view the etymological fallacy?

This is my answer:
The etymological fallacy is the fallacy of assuming that the original meaning of a word is its current meaning. But when we try to determine the meaning of a biblical author we are trying to determine not what the words originally meant but what the author meant by what he says. Of course, each text has more than one author, and it is the divine author's meaning that is more important. It may also be the case that the meaning of a text wasn't recognized (and maybe couldn't have been recognized) by the first readers. This is the case with some prophecies, I think.

Penal Substitution

Why don't we allow penal substitution in society? Why is it, for example, that we don't allow a husband to serve a wife's gaol sentence? Indeed, why don't we allow someone to pay another's fine? If I just write a cheque to the magistrate's court and say 'that's to cover the next few people that you fine' they won't accept it. Of course, I can actually give the money to the guilty person and let him or her pay the fine, but this isn't analogous to the Protestant doctrine of penal substitution; in fact, it is analogous to the Roman-Catholic idea that Christ makes satisfaction for us and we offer that sacrifice to God in the mass.

Why didn't God give us a systematic theology?

Here's a question inspired by some comments of Timothy Davis: why, if studying theology systematically is important and something we should do, didn't God give us a systematic theology? (No cheeky replies of 'He has!', please!)

Guilt and Grace

Should we feel guilty when we sin? Should we still feel guilty after repenting? Should we still feel guilty in the next life for what we have done in this life? If Jesus has taken all our guilt on the cross then it would seem as if we should never feel guilty. On the other hand if Jesus has taken only our 'actual guilt' but not our 'potential guilt' then why shouldn't we feel guilty even in the next life (or will even our potential guilt be removed there?)?

Repentance and Faith

We say that repentance and faith are necessary for salvation (though some say that they are consequences of salvation and not conditions of it). But is their necessity absolute or due to God's free decision? In other words, could God have established other conditions for the application of redemption, or did God have to choose these because they were antecedently necessary?

Anybody know?

Why does the Father love the elect?

Heppe (p. 411) is normally very reliable, but this time he has me baffled. He says, citing Olevianus (De Substantia Foederis, p. 26):

The covenant of grace rested sheerly on the twofold vow which the Son in eternity had promised to the Father and on the commission which accordingly the Father had imparted to the Son; consequently only the absolute love of the Father for the Son is the cause by which the Father also loves the elect.

Does 'also' qualify 'the Father' here (as grammar would lead one to expect) or does it qualify 'the elect'? In other words, does 'the Father also loves the elect' mean here 'the Father loves the elect in addition to the Son's love of the elect' or 'the Father loves the elect in addition to his love of the Son'?

On the first interpretation it would seem that what is meant is that the Son loved the elect and the Father had no prior love for them but, since he loved the Son, loved the Son's elect, much as I might love my wife's furnishing catalogues just because she loves them rather than off my own bat? I'd always assumed, in contradiction of the above, that the Father loved the elect gratuitously, and that the Son and Spirit either loved the elect gratuitously too, or took the lead from the Father (else they might end up loving different individuals!).

On the second interpretation, is the text saying merely that the Father loves the elect only because he foresees them as 'in Christ'? In other words, is the text saying that if we had never been united with Christ the Father couldn't have loved the elect because they would never have been holy, but he can love the elect because he foresees them as being in Christ? But the problem with this line is that surely there must be a logically antecedent love that God has for the elect in order to explain why not all are elect.

Can anyone clarify this for me, please?

The 'twofold vow', according to this learned article, is explained by Olevianus thus:

The Son of God, having been appointed by God as Mediator of the covenant, becomes the guarantor on two counts: 1) He shall satisfy for the sins of all those whom the Father has given him, 2) He shall also bring it to pass that they, being planted in him, shall enjoy freedom in their consciences and from day to day be renewed in the image of God.

Ordo Salutis

Ian has raised on this blog some interesting questions on the ordo salutis, or the order of the events that comprise the application of our salvation. I have tried to answer him in the comments section, but I thought that others might be interested in posting comments too.

The more general question is this: what is the logical order in which the various aspects of our salvation come? Specifically we are now interested in the order of the application of redemption (as opposed to Jesus's purchase of redemption, which was the subject of my post on imputation and union), and we are concerned with the logical order, since all admit that there is no temporal order here.

This good article says that the order is:
effectual calling, regeneration, faith and repentance, justification, adoption, definitive sanctification, progressive sanctification (perseverance), and glorification.

But the main point of this post is to draw people's attention to an excellent article that contains a detailed discussion of Bavinck, Calvin, Murray, Gaffin, Berkhof, Berkouwer, and Hoekema. (You need to scroll down past the Italian!)

If you have a comment on the order of salvation please feel free to post it below.

What is legalism and why is it wrong?

One is inclined to say that legalism is putting the letter of the law above the spirit of the law:
2 Corinthians 3:6
He has made us competent as ministers of a new covenant—not of the letter but of the Spirit; for the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life. (NIV)
But surely one can take seriously both the spirit and the letter of the law? And if we believe in plenary verbal inspiration surely the letter of the law is as inspired as the spirit?

Maybe a legalist is someone that takes literally a command that isn't meant to be taken literally? What would be an example? Well, Origen famously took the following command seriously, even though it doesn't seem to have been meant as such (though, having said that, the second sentence is literally true, so why shouldn't we take the first as such?).
Matthew 5:30
And if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it away. It is better for you to lose one part of your body than for your whole body to go into hell. (NIV)

Are we better off than Adam?

A question inspired by a comment by Timothy on the blog. Isaac Watts wrote:

the tribes of Adam boast more glories than their father lost

Was he right? Are we now better off than Adam was in Eden? If not, shall we be better off in the next life than Adam was in Eden? If so, is that why God allowed the Fall, in order that we might be better off? And is that supralapsarianism?

People may be interested to see the Web site of David Field of Oak Hill College. He has a paper defending the use of birth control. His survey of recent work in systematic theology is also interesting. People may also be interested to see his Revelation party game!

Tom's question -- is faith a work?

Tom Ward raises an interesting question in a comment on a post of mine:
Do we receive Christ's righteousness, on the Protestant scheme, by anything we do? If so, does that not count, for Protestants, as a work?

I think the answer is that we do do something to receive righteousness, viz. exercise faith. This doesn't count as a work because the will is passive at this point.

There are two other suggestions, both less common and (probably heterodox):
(i) we are justified from all eternity, and do not receive righteousness at conversion
(ii) faith doesn't count as a work because it is merely the reception of what has already been achieved for us by Christ -- but could one not still boast if the will is active here?

Women and Politics

We all know that there is currently a great debate over whether women should be allowed to become bishops (in the Church of England) or ministers (other denominations). But there is an interesting history of protest against women playing a role in public society. Harper's Magazine in 1893 said:

This unblushing female socialism defies alike the apostles and prophets. Nothing could be more antibiblical than letting women vote.

It's well known that John Knox wrote a tract with the title:
The First Blast of the Trumpet Against the Monstrous Regiment of Women.

Does anybody know whether there were complaints in England against giving women the vote and allowing women to become MPs etc? I don't recall any complaints that Mrs Thatcher's rise to be Prime Minister was unbiblical; in fact, most of the people I know that disagree with women's being pastors voted for her (if they were of age).

Were there criticisms against Queen Elizabeth I on a similar basis?

If you know please post a comment.

Traducianism vs Creationism

Here is another debate that baffles me, that between traducianism and creationism. Creationism is not here the doctrine that God created the world in 6 literal 24-hour days, but the view that God creates every human soul directly. Traducianism is the view that reproduction involves not just the creation of the bodies of infants, but also the creation of the souls.

Can anybody out there cast any light on this debate? There is an article on traducianism here. You can read Turretin's defence of creationism here.

A Christian History of the World

You may be interested to see Jonathan Edwards's History of the Work of Redemption (text in progress; read the whole thing here). It was an attempted history of the world from Adam to the end of the world, including post-biblical events such as the Reformation. Does anyone know of any other attempted Christian history of the world? (Ussher's Annals of the World stops at AD 70.)

Which comes first, union or imputation?

Some seem to suggest that God couldn’t be united with us until we had been justified, because he couldn’t unite himself with something that wasn't holy; others seem to suggest that God couldn’t impute Christ’s righteousness to us unless we were united with him first, just as the imputation of Adam’s sin depends on our union with Adam.

So, I’m puzzled! Anybody out there got an answer?

Murray on imputation

You can read John Murray's brilliant little book on the imputation of Adam's sin here. It deals very well with the questions I raised.

Imputation of what?

Protestants hold that there are three imputations described in the Bible: from Adam to us, from the elect to Christ, and from Christ to the elect. But what are these imputations of?
(1) Is it Adam's sin, the guilt for his sin, the liability to punishment for his sin, or the punishment itself that is imputed to us?
(2) Is it the elect's sins, the guilt for the elect's sins, the liability to punishment for the elect's sin, or the punishment itself that is imputed to Christ?
(3) Is it the righteous deeds of Christ, the righteousness of those deeds, the liability to God's favour for those deeds, or the favour itself that is imputed to the elect?

I'm confused; can anyone out there help me?

Thanks!

Must God Punish sin?

I have just read a little book by Ben Cooper of St Helen's, Bishopsgate, Must God Punish Sin?

The question is: could God have forgiven us by a mere word without any need to punish Jesus in our place? Or, if not, why did God have to punish sin? Just because he decided to set up the moral system that way ('consequent hypothetical necessity')? Or is the need to punish sin part of God's nature, about which even he cannot do anything ('absolute necessity')?

Socinus takes the first line:

The second line is taken by many of the orthodox, e. g. William Twisse:
'That God, by his absolute power, setting aside his decree or free constitution, can forgive sin without any satisfaction'.
And Norton, in his Orthodox Evangelist, chap. iii says,
'God, by his absolute power, could have saved man without a Mediator: he is omnipotent, and could have done what he pleased.'
Rutherford says:
`Fifthly, I love not to dispute here, but God, if we speak of his absolute power, without respect to his free decree, could have pardoned sin without a ransom, and gifted all mankind and fallen angels with heaven, without any satisfaction of either the sinner, or his surety; for he neither punisheth sin, nor tenders heaven to men or angels by necessity of nature, as the fire casteth out heat, and the sun light; but freely: only, supposing that frame of providence, and decrees of punishing, and redeeming sinners, that now is, the Lord could not but be steady in his decrees; yet this is but necessity conditional, and at the second hand. But here was the business, God, in the depth of his eternal wisdom, did so frame and draw the design and plot of saving lost man, as salvation was to run in no other channel, but such an one, the bank whereof was the freest grace and tenderest love that can enter into the heart of men or angels; for he drew the lines of our heaven through grace, all the way.'
Calvin seems to be of this camp too. He says in Institutes II.12.1:
'IT deeply concerned us, that he who was to be our Mediator should be very God and very man. If the necessity be inquired into, it was not what is commonly termed simple or absolute, but flowed from the divine decree on which the salvation of man depended.'
He also says in his commentary on John xv.13:
'God might, by a word only, or by his command, have redeemed us; but he took this way through his Son, that his love might be made more manifest.'

Cooper takes the third line, along with John Owen, A Dissertation on Divine Justice.

Does anybody out there have any view on this question?

Misreading the Bible?

We all know that sects and heresies have started through people misinterpreting the Bible, and many false ideas have sprung up through mistranslations (cf. the mistranslation of Exodus 34: 29 as Moses's possession of horns), and some false ideas have been promulgated by printing errors, such as the famous Wicked Bible. Some more printing errors are catalogued here. But my question is: has any major error, sect, or heresy arisen from a simple misreading (i.e. error of eyesight or careless reading)? If you know of one or have any more good examples of mistranslations or printing errors please feel free to post them below.

Daniel Defoe

David Haslam has kindly reminded me of the Christian content of some of Defoe's other works. Defoe in fact produced more than 500 books, pamphlets, and tracts. I think the unabridged version of Robinson Crusoe is available here. A Journal of the Plague Year is also available on the Web.

Is it ever permissible to lie? The case of Rahab

It seems to me that Scripture rules out lying. See Leviticus 19:11 and Ephesians 4:25.

The case of Rahab is often brought up (e.g. by some commentators on this blog) as a case in which God approves of lying. The case is described in Joshua 2:

1 Then Joshua son of Nun secretly sent two spies from Shittim. "Go, look over the land," he said, "especially Jericho." So they went and entered the house of a prostitute named Rahab and stayed there.

2 The king of Jericho was told, "Look! Some of the Israelites have come here tonight to spy out the land." 3 So the king of Jericho sent this message to Rahab: "Bring out the men who came to you and entered your house, because they have come to spy out the whole land."

4 But the woman had taken the two men and hidden them. She said, "Yes, the men came to me, but I did not know where they had come from. 5 At dusk, when it was time to close the city gate, the men left. I don't know which way they went. Go after them quickly. You may catch up with them." 6 (But she had taken them up to the roof and hidden them under the stalks of flax she had laid out on the roof.) 7 So the men set out in pursuit of the spies on the road that leads to the fords of the Jordan, and as soon as the pursuers had gone out, the gate was shut.

The first thing to note is that it isn't absolutely clear that Rahab does lie here. How do we know that she did know from where (specifically) the men had come? How do we know that the men didn't leave (leave what?) at dusk, returning to Rahab's later? How do we know that Rahab did know which way they went from wherever it was to her house? And how do we know that Rahab knew that 'you may catch up with them' was false? (Admittedly, the ESV has 'will' for 'may' here.) Anyway, I shall proceed on the plausible but unproven assumption that Rahab was lying: even if her words weren't strictly false she seems to have been out to deceive.

The next thing to note is that there is, of course, no commendation of Rahab by God in Joshua 2. But James 2: 25 comes in here. Here is my literal translation from the Greek:
25 But in the same way was not even Rahab the prostitute justified by works, having received the messengers and sent them out in a different direction?
Although this is a question, it clearly expects the answer 'yes', and so may be treated as an affirmation. But note that James 2: 25 doesn't say that Rahab the prostitute was considered righteous because she lied. The Greek says she was considered righteous by her 'works'. The inference is (though this is not explicitly said) that her works were the things mentioned: receiving the messengers and sending them out in a different direction? Who were these 'messengers'? The spies or their pursuers?

In the first case there is no hint of a problem. The word 'received', which can also mean 'welcomed', fits this case better. Also compare Hebrews 11: 31, which I translate literally as follows:
By faith Rahab the prostitute did not perish with those that had disobeyed, having received the spies with peace.
Here the word 'received' in Greek is closely connected with the word for 'received' in James 2: 25, and here there is no doubt that it is the spies about whom we are talking. (Incidentally, some commentators think that 'received' is a euphemism hinting at Rahab doing her job with the Israelites. I doubt that this is true, but if it is it does fit more with the spies than with the pursuers.)

In the second case Rahab is still not commended for lying, but rather for sending the pursuers out in another direction (i.e. as opposed to welcoming them into the house to look for the spies). Sending someone in another direction is not lying. It seems true that Rahab achieved this end by a lie, but it is this end, not her means, that is commended here -- if this interpretation is correct.

The basic point that James is making is, of course, that Rahab didn't just sit around believing, but actually acted on her beliefs . He is not making the point that everything she did was good. I think that Rahab was wrong to lie, but right to try to save the spies, and that this is why she is commended.

One final thought: some may say that one cannot be a spy without lying. But the spies are not commended by God for what they did. In any case, they may be more like SAS-style secret agents trying to move about unseen (unsuccessfully in this case) than like MI6-style spies with false identities etc.

May we ever break any of the 10 commandments?

May we ever break any of the ten commandments? Jesus himself seems to suggest at Luke 13: 14 - 16 that we may perform what are sometimes called 'works of mercy' on the Sabbath, which would appear to be breaches of the fourth commandment. Is it ever permissible to steal? I think it might well be permissible to steal to save a life: for example to steal a weapon from a homicidal criminal. I think it's sometimes permissible to kill, e.g. in war, but never to murder. If you disagree or think that we may break other of the 10 commandments please post a comment below.

Exodus 20

The Ten Commandments

1 And God spoke all these words:

2 "I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of Egypt, out of the land of slavery.

3 "You shall have no other gods before me.

4 "You shall not make for yourself an idol in the form of anything in heaven above or on the earth beneath or in the waters below. 5 You shall not bow down to them or worship them; for I, the LORD your God, am a jealous God, punishing the children for the sin of the fathers to the third and fourth generation of those who hate me, 6 but showing love to a thousand {generations} of those who love me and keep my commandments.

7 "You shall not misuse the name of the LORD your God, for the LORD will not hold anyone guiltless who misuses his name.

8 "Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. 9 Six days you shall labor and do all your work, 10 but the seventh day is a Sabbath to the LORD your God. On it you shall not do any work, neither you, nor your son or daughter, nor your manservant or maidservant, nor your animals, nor the alien within your gates. 11 For in six days the LORD made the heavens and the earth, the sea, and all that is in them, but he rested on the seventh day. Therefore the LORD blessed the Sabbath day and made it holy.

12 "Honor your father and your mother, so that you may live long in the land the LORD your God is giving you.

13 "You shall not murder.

14 "You shall not commit adultery.

15 "You shall not steal.

16 "You shall not give false testimony against your neighbor.

17 "You shall not covet your neighbor's house. You shall not covet your neighbor's wife, or his manservant or maidservant, his ox or donkey, or anything that belongs to your neighbor."

Defoe on contraception

Many people know about Defoe’s ‘Shortest Way with Dissenters’, but here are some lesser-known pieces by him:

+ DEFOE, DANIEL

A Treatise Concerning the Use and Abuse of the Marriage Bed (1727)

The title continues: "Showing: I. The nature of matrimony, its sacred original and the true meaning of its institution; II. The gross abuse of matrimonial chastity, from the wrong notions which have possessed the world, degenerating even to whoredom; III, The Diabolical practice of attempting to prevent child-bearing by physical preparations; IV. The fatal consequences of clandestine or forced marriages, through the persuasion, interests, or influence of parents and relations, to wed the person they have no love for, but oftentimes an aversion to; V. Of unequal matches, as to the disproportion of age; and how such, many ways, occasion a matrimonial whoredom; VI. How married persons may be guilty of conjugal lewdness, and that a man may, in effect, make a whore of his own wife; Also many other particulars of family concern." From the author of Robinson Crusoe and many other writings. 104 pages.

***

+ DEFOE, DANIEL

Religious Courtship: Being Historical Discourses, On the Necessity of Marrying Religious Husbands and Wives Only (1743)

Contraception in Protestantism

Lest anyone think that the previous posts have been particularly directed towards Roman Catholics, let me add that almost all Protestants until the 20th century thought contraception was wrong. The first occasion I can find of Protestants taking a different view is the Lambeth Conference of the Anglican Communion in 1930. In 1980 the Lambeth Conference was, apparently, still condemning contraception.

Charles D. Provan has written a whole book, The Bible and Birth Control, on this topic. Here are some choice extracts:
Martin Luther once proclaimed that "the purpose of marriage is not pleasure and ease but the procreation and education of children and the support of a family.... People who do not like children are swine, dunces, and blockheads, not worthy to be called men and women, because they despise the blessing of God, the Creator and Author of marriage" (Christian History, Issue 39, p. 24). Luther also said that birth control was the equivalent of sodomy (probably because of the likeness between homosexual wickedness and impotent sex). John Calvin declared that birth control was the murder of future persons and the Synod of Dort issued a Bible commentary which stated that contraception was the same as abortion.

Of course, I don't endorse the sentiments expressed above, but they make interesting reading. If you have any comments or know of earlier Protestant support for contraception please post below.

Sterility and Impotence

The Canons of the Catholic Church state:

Can. 1084 ß1 Antecedent and perpetual impotence to have sexual intercourse, whether on the part of the man or on that of the woman, whether absolute or relative, by its very nature invalidates marriage.

ß2 If the impediment of impotence is doubtful, whether the doubt be one of law or one of fact, the marriage is not to be prevented nor, while the doubt persists, is it to be declared null.

ß3 Without prejudice to the provisions of can. 1098, sterility neither forbids nor invalidates a marriage.

I suggested in a previous post that this was inconsistent. This suggestion was wrong. The explanation is given in the New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law:
'In matrimonial consent the spouses exchange the perpetual and exclusive right to conjugal acts per se apt for the generation of children, not the right to have children'.
But I don't know how far this right goes: it clearly extends to at least one such act -- if one's spouse refuses to engage at least once in a 'conjugal act per se apt for the generation of children' then the marriage is not consummated (in the eyes of Rome) and may legitimately be dissolved. But suppose one's spouse consented only during the so-called 'safe period', thus not allowing children to be generated, has the spouse then fulfilled the other's rights?

Were Adam and Eve married before the Fall?

Some questions inspired by Tim's helpful comment on the previous post:
(1) Were Adam and Eve married before the Fall?
(2) Did they have sexual intercourse before the Fall?
For a Roman-Catholic negative answer to (1) go here.
For a Roman-Catholic negative answer to (2) go here.
I'm not sure whether there is an 'official' RC line on these matters: anyone know?
John Keble certainly said `yes' to (1): his hymn `The Voice that breathed o'er Eden' is often used at weddings today.
Milton answered 'yes' to both. But why then were there no children? Just because the Fall followed on so closely (we presume) from Eve's creation? Or because sex had no procreative role then?

Any other answers out there? And what does this tell us about the nature and purpose of sex and marriage now? Roman Catholics say that it tells us that marriage is a sacrament, established as a means of grace to counteract the Fall. But is this right?

Why is there no marriage in the next life?

Luke 20:35-36 says that there is no marriage in the next life:
35But those who are considered worthy of taking part in that age and in the resurrection from the dead will neither marry nor be given in marriage, 36and they can no longer die; for they are like the angels. They are God's children, since they are children of the resurrection.
Why is this the case?
Some Roman Catholics argue that there is no marriage in the next life because there is no procreation in the next life, and this is because there is no death in the next life (v. 36). They then infer from this that there would have been no marriage if there had been no procreation, and from this that procreation is the main intended purpose of marriage, on which all other purposes depend, and from this that anyone intending to get married must intend to attempt procreation.
Where, if at all, does this line of reasoning go wrong? If it goes wrong what is the answer to the title question?

(Roman Catholics also infer that every act of sexual intercourse must not be artificially prevented from procreating; in this I think they do go wrong -- it doesn't follow from an institution's having a purpose that every act undertaken in the name of that institution must have the same purpose.)

If you have an answer please post it as a comment.

Does God love the reprobate?

Most Christians think that God loves the reprobate and wants to save them. Some Scriptures seem to support this, such as 2 Peter 3:9:
The Lord is not slow in keeping his promise, as some understand slowness. He is patient with you, not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance.
Other Christians -- Calvinists -- thinks that God, in some sense, doesn't want to save them. Some Scriptures seem to suggest this, such as Luke 10:13:
"Woe to you, Korazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago, sitting in sackcloth and ashes.
The argument is: God could have performed in Tyre and Sidon the miracles that he actually did perform in Korazin and Bethsaida, and he knew that if he were to do so then the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would have repented, but he chose not to. If he chose not to that could only be because he didn't want to.
But here's another question for the Calvinist: why does God create the reprobate if he doesn't love them enough to save them? And why does God give them happiness if he doesn't love them enough to save them? Hoeksema says that God creates the reprobates for the sake of the elect (see also here) -- but is this really correct?

If you have an answer please post it as a comment.

Daniel Hill

Are the unregenerate in the image of God?

Here is a good posing of the question.

Here is an answer in the negative:

You can read Calvin's (rather ambiguous) answer here:

A bit of research seems to suggest that the Three Forms of Unity (particularly the Canons of Dort (Heads III and IV, Article 1)), but not the Westminster Standards, hold that the unregenerate are not in the image of God. John Murray wrote an essay defending the view that everyone is in the image of God, but I cannot find this on-line.

If you have an answer, please post it as a comment to this post.

Daniel Hill